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I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption has become a major topic of almost daily attention
within the media. It has been of varying degrees of concern in different
countries. Historic and cultural differences play a role. In some Asian or
Arab cultures, for instance, the bakshish mentality is a way of life and is
socially accepted. In other countries, partly due to a lack of strength on the
part of the government and to the power of organized crime, bribery is
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notorious and overwhelming. Thus, in recent years, sensational bribery
cases concerning bribery of politicians, as well as of government officials,
have been covered by the international press and have been dealt with in
the different jurisdictions.
Examples of such bribery include the cases of top Italian politicians
and tried for receiving money from the Mafia, as well as the
accused
being
case in Singapore about the public official who was sentenced to fourteen
years of prison after it was proven that, in exchange for confidential
information in regard of government orders, he had received at least ten
million dollars over the years from international companies.' Politicians
around the world are accused of using their offices for the benefit of their
political parties.
It has always been obvious, but seems to become more commonly
understood, that international corruption harms domestic economies
because it creates unnecessary expense, as well as losses for those
competitors that attempt to market their products on a fair basis.
A. IBA Study Concerning Corruption
The Standing Committee on International Legal Practice, Section
on Business Law of the International Bar Association (IBA), has recently
published a comparative analysis of answers by lawyers from thirteen
mostly industrialized jurisdictions (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United States) to a questionnaire regarding the respective
legal settings of corruption.2 It led to interesting results. While there is a
substantial consistency among the different jurisdictions in their criminal
law approzch to fighting corruption on a domestic basis, the treatment of
international corruption, for example, the bribery of foreign public
officials, wherever it may take place, reveals important differences. Only
five of the questioned states declare some form of international corruption
a criminal act, while just three of these five do not require that the bribe be
committed within their own territory. 3 That leaves the remaining eight

I.

See Mark Pieth, Internationale Bestechungsfdlle und ihre strafrechtliche

Verarbeitung, SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 313 (1996).
Sietze Hepkema & Willem Booysen, Bribery of Public Officails: An IBA Survey,
2.
INT'L Bus. LAW, Oct., 1997, at 415-16.

3. The five countries first referred to are England, Sweden, the Netherlands, the
United States, and Australia (New South Wales), whereas Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
United States make up for the jurisdictions referred to in the latter part. Hepkema & Booysen,
supra note 2, at 415-16.
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jurisdictions without the possibility to prosecute and punish international
bribery under their criminal statutes.,
Interesting distinctions were found with respect to the tax treatment
of payments to public officials as well. Only five jurisdictions were found
to explicitly deny the deductibility of bribery payments as legitimate
business expenses under their respective tax laws.' That leaves the other
questioned states allowing the deduction of international bribe payments by
the concerned private business organizations.
B. Corruption in Germany
Germany has traditionally enjoyed a relatively low degree of
corruption. At least, that is the perception. One can only speculate why:
1)
The system of governmental employment, civil service, has
provided for highly (some say overly) paid public officials with
considerable social standing and absolute job security in exchange
for an almost fiduciary relationship with the state/employer; and
2)
Traditionally, there has been less opportunity for
bribery, due to a comparatively low level of state owned industries;
however, where opportunity exists (for instance with building permit
procedures, public procurements), bribery has been present also in
Germany.
These conditions have changed in particular since reunification with the
former East Germany:
1)
The public service sector is no longer as highly respected
as before. Budget deficits led to pay freezes and outsourcing, and
high unemployment has caused envy and has led to reduced respect
for the civil service; and
2)
In order for Germany to fulfill the convergence criteria for
participation in Europe, there are increased opportunities due to
privatization in eastern Germany and in Germany as a whole.
As a response to the rapidly growing influence of corruption on German
society and economy,6 prompt action became necessary to combat the
4.

Belgium,

Canada,
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France,

Germany,

Italy, and

Japan.

Switzerland has to be added to this group of countries. Pieth, supra note 1, at 315.
5. Canada, England, Chile, Italy, and, under certain limitations Denmark.
Hepkema & Booysen, supra note 2, at 415-16. In Denmark those payments are only deductible
if they are considered a customary and necessary means for conducting business in the relevant
foreign jurisdiction. d.
6. Estimated total economical damages per annum are $300-350 billion. Korruption
ist ein Kontrolldelikt, [Interview with Wolfgang J. Schaupensteiner, the Senior District Attorney
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further spread of that cancerous disease. It also follows that in Germany
corruption as a problem has become a focal point now.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND
STANDARDIZATION
As long as domestic laws do not globally prohibit international
corruption, one major practical argument against internationalcorruption
efforts is the level playing field defense: we do not want to put our
exporters at a competitive disadvantage from competitors in corruptionpermissive countries.
To change that situation and because of the disadvantages already
mentioned, political (mainly from the United States) as well as (private)
economic pressure have led to different and independent, but nevertheless
very strong and hopeful efforts to ban corruption on an unified or
harmonized international basis. What are those international efforts?
II.

.A. EU Conveniion
On May 26, 1997, the Council of the European Union (EU),
acting under Title VI (Article K.3 (2) (c)) of the Treaty of the European
Union, adopted the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of
the European Union (EU Convention). Following its signing as the next
step, all European Union (EU) member states are to ratify the Convention
and to adjust their criminal laws concerning corruption accordingly. To
date (February 1998), no member state has ratified the EU Convention.
The EU Convention will only enter into force ninety days after notification
by the last member state that its domestic ratification procedures are
completed.
In Articles 2 and 3, the EU Convention distinguishes between
passive and active corruption, a common distinction under all domestic
laws concerned. Thus, the main and decisive innovation will relate to the
scope of coverage. It will include with regard to bribe actions with
officials of other EU countries as well as EU officials. That transborder
effect has been lacking under most domestic jurisdictions, which is even
more disturbing in the EU since the interdependence among the EU
member states has grown to previously unknown proportions, and since
virtually domestic market conditions exist. Furthermore, punishment of
and Special Corruption Officer of the District County of Frankfurter am Main, by Dr. Norbert
Copray], LAY REPORT 6 (1997). According to Schaupensteiner, police statistics provided by the
German F.B.I. counted since the first year of its official listing in 1994 documented there were
1557 bribery cases already. (on file with author) [hereinafter LAY REPORT].
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corruption will not be dependent on its success, but instead on the intent to
bribe.
Extensive concern is placed on the harmonization of domestic laws
in the member states and on cooperation of criminal enforcement
authorities. Article 6 deserves special recognition in that it requires
members to potentially make heads of businesses vicariously liable under
penal laws for acts of their employees within their business units.
Notwithstanding the innovative and important approach to extend
the domestic criminal laws to international bribery, the EU Convention is
also limited in two regards. First, only bribery action vis-A-vis public
officials, not private individuals, is targeted. Second, the prescribed
changes exclusively concern criminal legal measures. Other areas of the
law, like tax legislation or administrative measures, are not addressed by
the articles of the Convention.
B. OECD Measures
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) differs from the EU in many aspects, but, to our concern, it is the
difference in membership (including non-EU members such as. the United
States, Australia, Canada, Japan) that becomes crucial for the combat of
international bribery. At this point, almost thirty states are members in the
OECD.
The Council of the OECD decided upon a Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (OECD-Convention) as of
May 23, 1997. This convention was signed by the OECD member states
on November 20, 1997. The Convention shall enter into force on the
sixtieth day after five of the ten member states with the highest exports
share, representing sixty percent of the total export share of these ten
countries, have ratified it.
Although the scope of both Conventions is similar, the OECDConvention differs in important material respects from the EU-Convention.
The main distinctions, some of a narrowing nature, others extending the
field of application of the OECD-Convention,'7 are:
1)
Only active corruption, such as bribing an official, is
included, not passive bribery committed by an official (Article 1).
Only bribe payments in order to obtain or retain a concrete
2)
Thus, the so-called
business deal are considered criminal.

7.
The following analysis is based on the latest available proposal for the draft
convention. During the final adoption process certain changes may have been made.
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facilitating payments preceding the business relationship itself
might still be tolerated.
3)
In contrast to the EU-Convention, not only governmental
officials in member countries of the organization, but all officials
in foreign government functions as well as all officials in
international organizations are going to be included.
4)
Lastly, it is not clear whether prosecution has to be made
or if national law may leave discretion for the respective domestic
enforcement organs to decide about criminal action when
international bribe actions become known. Ultimately, under good
faith principles a party may not use this discretion to circumvent its
obligations to combat bribery in accordance with the OECD
Convention.
Still, considering the less than hopeless attempts by the United
Nations in the 1970s to create an Anti-Corruption Convention, it is a major
success for the OECD to form a global alliance to combat international
bribery. It must be seen as a starting point on which future efforts can be
built.
Prior to the adoption of, and in addition to the above-described
OECD-Convention, the Council of the OECD released an official
recommendation "On Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions. ",
Apart from referring to the desired criminalization of international
bribery in the member countries, the recommendation comprises many
different measures. It addresses topics like tax deductibility, accounting
requirements, auditing methods, internal company controls, public
procurement, and others. Due to its informal nature, the effects of the
recommendation may lead to precise government action in the member
states, but shows an international consensus to fight corruption and also
might precede future OECD actions with more authoritative strength.
C: Council of Europe Action and OtherInternationalEfforts
The Council of Europe, which is an organization that is distinct
from, and less integrated than, the EU membership with a much wider
membership, has been working on the subject of international bribery as
well. Mainly by cooperation provisions referring to the Council of Europe
in the Treaty of the European Union, the linkages between both
international organizations have tightened. As a result, the importance of
the Council of Europe has grown considerably.
8.

OECD Doc. (C (97) 123/final) (May 30, 1997).
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The efforts by the Council of Europe are meaningful for mainly
one reason. In contrast to the European Union, the membership of the
Council of Europe includes most former communist Eastern European
States. For the purpose of reaching a level playing field throughout
Europe, the inclusion of the Eastern European economies, which provide
for many problems in the context of corruption and organized crime in the
EU-member states, seems necessary.
Other organizations that have been dealing with international
bribery are the Organization of American States (OAS) 9 and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in the context of its rules of Public
Procurement.
III. CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION IN GERMANY
Bribery can be dealt with under criminal, civil, tax, and
administrative law. At the annual German Lawyers' Congress 1996 in
Karlsruhe, one focus was organized crime and corruption. Following
those discussions, and after surprisingly similar bills were introduced by all
parties and legislative organs of German government, the German
legislature became active. In August 1997, the Bundestag (the lower
House in the German Parliament) passed an anti-corruption act 0 to tighten
criminal law as well as other segments of the German legal system on the
wide field of corruption.
A. CriminalLaw
The Anti Corruption Act does not criminalize international
bribery. According to sections 3, 5, 6, and 7 of the German Penal Code
(known as the Strafgesehbuch (StGB)), German criminal laws, like most
other criminal laws, only apply in cases with a close domestic connection.
A specific provision for the punishment of international bribery does not
exist yet.
The Anti Corruption Act of this year did not alter this concept.
Thus, only domestic, but not international bribery remains criminalized,
unless such conduct otherwise falls within the scope of fraud,
embezzlement, or tax evasion. However, many if not most situations of
9. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996); Manfred MOhrenschliiger, Strafrechtliche Vorhaben Zur
Bekdmpfung der Korruption auf Nationaler Und InternationalerEbene, JURISTENZEITUNG 822,
831 (1996).
10. The Act on the Combat of Corruption and other Measures for Fighting
Corruption entered into force on August 20, 1997. (BGBI. I, S.2038) [hereinafter the AntiCorruption Act].
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international bribery do not fulfill the code definition of bribery or the
ancillary crimes.
Despite those shortcomings, there are a number of positive changes
under German criminal laws that are worth mentioning:
1)
The definition of government official was broadened to
include employees of public entities organized under private law,
and it now matches the EU-Convention's definition described
above. For example, not the form of the entity by which the
person is employed, but the substantive scope of the occupation in
question determines the quality as potential addressee and potential
perpetrator of passive bribery.
2)
In contrast to the former law, the favor being sought by the
private party does not have to refer to a specific action by the
official, but it is sufficient that the favor is granted within the
context of the official's duties.
3)
This amendment reflects the statutory purpose of
maintaining the trust of the public in the Public Administration.
Formerly, the official had to benefit at least indirectly from his or
her wrongdoing (e.g., donation to official's sport club); under the
amendment, benefits to third parties not directly related to the
official are sufficient (e.g., donation to the church).
4)
The potential punishment was raised to a maximum of ten
years for severe bribery. The minimum sentence for certain
actions such as when bribery leads to illegal acts of the influenced
officials, was raised to one or to two years, which is the threshold
to become a felony (in contrast to a misdemeanor).
5)
Under the amendment, protection of free competition has
been emphasized much more by moving the provisions into the
Penal Code and by increasing the punishment. Among the more
interesting provisions rank the prohibition of illegal agreements in
the context of public procurement" and in bribery in private
business dealings.12
As a result, it has to be emphasized that there still remains a
decisive distinction from the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

11. § 298 StGB.
12. § 299 StGB (formerly and with less severity included only in section 12 of the
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), which stands for the Act Against Unfair
Competition). For a detailed look at all the changes, see Mattias Korte, Kampfansage gegen die
Korruption, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2556, 2557 (1997).
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because under current German law it is not illegal to bribe foreign public
officials.

B. Civil Law
For many years, the German Federal Supreme Court has held that
contracts resulting from bribery actions are void under section 138 BGB,
the German Civil Code, as conflicting with "bonos mores."" Thus, a
party that formerly paid under the table is not only hindered from
enforcing its seemingly contractual claim, but it also has to bear all the
consequences resulting from the nullity of the contract in concern. In
addition, bribe payments can lead to the obligation to pay damages under
the intentional fraud provisions of the Civil Code, section 826 BGB.
C. Tax Law
Under German tax law, it is, in principle, possible to deduct
foreign bribe payments as necessary business expenses. 4 However, there
are limitations to that rule. For instance, according to section 4 (as
amended) of the German Income Tax Code, the deduction is disallowed if
the concerned action has led to prosecution or sentencing under the
5
German criminal code.
Since under the current criminal code actions of international
bribery are not included, those expenses do not fall within section 4.
Thus, they remain deductible, at least for now.
In addition, tax procedure rules give the tax authorities the right to
require precise disclosure of the recipient and the circumstances of the
deductible expense. This feature, combined with exchange of information
procedures between certain countries under their double taxation treaties
with Germany, can be expected to have a desirable impact on foreign
bribery activities.
D. Administrative Measures
It is important to note that companies and other judicial persons
cannot be criminally liable under German law. Hence, other measures
have to be found to get to the companies.

13.

94 BGHZ 268, 271.

14. Press release 20/94 by the BdF (Federal Treasury) as of March 21, 1994.
Bestechungs-und Schmiergelder, 5 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 436 (1994).
15. § 4 Abs. 5 S. 1 Nr. 10 EstG. For details, see Wolfgang Joecks, Abzugsverbotfr
Bestechungs- und Schmiergelder, 27 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STEUERRECHT 1025 (1997).
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To strengthen the effects of new legislation, (and also the
upcoming efforts to combat international bribery) administrative measures
like so called black lists have been put into place.
Companies that get caught in bribe actions have been listed with
the effect that they are banned from government orders for varying periods
of time. One German federal state, Hesse, came up with that procedure in
1995 and, in 1996, listed more than sixty enterprises. 6 The names on
these lists are kept strictly confidential from the public, but not to the
companies concerned. Just the number of companies being listed. is
published on a frequent basis. Public agencies intending to contract with
mainly private construction companies have to check with the Hessian
County Government to make sure that the company with whom they wish
to enter into a contract is not banned from government orders.
Similar methods are used abroad. It appears that this feature has
become very effective. For instance, in connection with an action that led
to imprisonment of a public official, one major German corporation was
banned from Singaporean government orders for five years."7
IV. COMPLIANCE EFFORTS BY THE INDUSTRY
There is growing concern among enterprises to make sure by
internal measures that corruption, including international bribery, is
contained. Experts are convinced that despite the necessity of tougher
criminal laws, international bribery can be successfully limited only by the
industry itself. "I Companies have to install effective internal revision
procedures and sanction mechanisms to be able to control and stop bribery
payments.
In an attempt to raise that topic and to help standardize those
internal means, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI),
the German Industry Association, recently published a pamphlet with
recommended guidelines of conduct.19 There is a common understanding
that the often made statement, "not companies, but their employees are
corrupt" does not reflect the true situation.2D Since, mainly higher level
management and representatives are able to participate in illegal antitrust
16. Littwin, Manahmen zur BekAnpfung der nationalen und internationalen
Korruption, Zeitschrift fur Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 1996.
17. Reiner Scholz, Uternehmen Schwarze Liste, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 7, 1997, at 30, 31.
18. See LAY REPORT, supra note 6.
19. BUNDESVERBAND
DER
DEUTSCHEN
INDUSTIE
EMPFEHLUNGEN
GESCHAFTSFUHRUNGEN
UND VORSTANDE DER GEWERBLICHEN
WIRTSCHAFT
BEKAMPFUNG DER KORRUPTION INDEUTSCHLAND, 3 [hereinafter BDI].
20. BDI, supra note 19; LAY REPORT supra note 6, at 6.
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agreements, sales agents and foreign branch representatives being involved
in such actions, typically receive orders from higher ranking management.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide for role model behavior by the boards
and leaders of the German companies operating in international business,
and by that, also to avoid the spectacular criminal trials we have seen in
recent years. Article 6 of the EU-Convention calling for criminal liability
of business heads when making bribery related decisions, must be seen in
this context.
In evaluating the BDI guidelines' recommendation of strict
observance of the German criminal law as the most important measure, the
question of the non-criminalization of international bribery must be raised.
So far enterprises have been able to hide behind the existing gap in
German statutory law, 2 an aspect United States companies have been
complaining about for a long time.
For the EU, the possibility to corrupt foreign officials and to
escape criminal liability will be gone with the new legislative act in 1998.
However, there will always be the difficulty to obtain knowledge of
foreign bribery payments. The OECD Convention, by requiring that the
member states secure their accounting and bookkeeping rules prevent
bribery payments from being covered up, will be a major step forward.
However, it appears to fall short of expressly prohibiting tax deductibility.
A realistic chance to achieve a certain control over bribery abroad, is the
strict implementation of internal company measures like specific training
and education of the employees, job rotation in positions with increased
exposure to the possibility of bribery, to create alternatives in the supply
chain, and so as to avoid dependencies, effective revision methods and
better cooperation among the concerned company departments.
V. OUTLOOK
In the context of growing concern about international corruption,
Germany will quickly attempt to tighten its legislative and administrative
measures. The Anti-Corruption Act of 1997 should be followed by new
legislative measures in 1998 to close the gap to the efforts by the EU and
the OECD. As it appears right now, a new legislative act will be
presented to the German parliament by April 1998 that should contain the
prescribed changes by the EU. Since all domestic parties agree in
substance, there should be no problem in passing that bill. It remains to be
seen, though, if the new act will be limited to the measures prescribed by
the EU-Convention or if it goes beyond, which seems possible, for
21. The cited pamphlet still leaves the door open for international bribe payments.
BDI, supra note 19, at 6.
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example, by banning tax deductibility of foreign bribe payments. This
should apply also to the efforts to adopt legislation in accordance with the
OECD-Convention. n
It is safe to say that there exists an almost unique coalition among
the opposing parties in the German Parliament, the Association of
Chambers of Commerce (known as the Deutscher Industrie-und Handilstag
(DIHT)), and the Federation of the German Industry (BDI) to combat
international bribery. That kind of common effort has become possible
since the awareness has grown that corruption is not only unethical, but
also harms the export industries with higher costs and unfair competition,
and thus, a level playing field would be beneficial for all involved.

22.

BT-Drs. (Bundestag-Drucksache) [Printed matter of the lower house of the

German Parliament] 13/8082 from June 26, 1997.

